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Deliberate concealmentAbstract 
Purpose Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government1 (Beesley hereafter) and Fidler v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government2 (Fidler hereafter) are two recent cases concerning deliberately concealed 
breaches of planning control. The defendants engaged in dishonest and misleading conduct, 
in an attempt to rely on a loophole within section 171B of the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1990 (T&CPA). . This article critically analyses two solutions which were created to close 
the loophole, in addition, the article analyses various alternative remedies that have been 
suggested, and lastly, whether the present law has been sufficient to remedy the situation. 
Approach The T&CPA is a key piece of legislation regulating planning controls; section 171A-
C provides the time limits for taking enforcement action against a breach of planning 
control. In order to achieve the above purpose, an evaluation of those provisions will be 
undertaken in detail.  Subsequently, this article will analyse two solutions which were 
created to close the loophole; firstly, the Supreme Court (SC) decision,3 and secondly, 
Parliaments decision to amend the T&CPA without awaiting the SC’s decision.4 
Findings This research concludes that Parliament should have awaited the SC’s decision 
before amending statute to prohibit reliance upon the expiration of time where there is an 
element of deliberate concealment. Additionally, this article suggests that the statutory 
amendments were not required in light of the SC’s solution in Beesley. As a result of 
Parliaments ill-considered decision, uncertainty has permeated through the conveyancing 
process, causing ambiguity, delays and additional expense in transactions at a time when a 
precarious property market needs anything but uncertainty. 
Research Limitations The scope of this research is limited to deliberate concealment of 
breaches of planning control and the four- year enforcement period; whilst considering the 
consequences of the solutions proposed it does not provide a detailed overview of the 
planning system, but rather assumes prior knowledge. 
Originality This article offers a unique assessment of the law relating to the deliberate 
concealment of planning breaches and offers a thorough criticism of the law with 
recommendations for reform. Additionally, a variety of alternative solutions are considered. 
Both legal academics, planning professionals and those interested in planning law will find 
the paper a thought-provoking digest.  
Keywords Planning Law, Deliberate Concealment, Planning Law Breaches, Environment, 
Development, Private Property. 
 
1 [2009] EWHC 966 (Admin); [2010] EWCA Civ 26; [2011] UKSC 15   
2 [2010] EWHC 143 (Admin); [2011] EWCA Civ 1159  
3 Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local government [2011] UKSC 15   
4 Section 124 of the Localism Act 2011  
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1) Introduction to Beesley & Fidler 
Planning cases rarely hit the headlines;5; ‘enforcement is perhaps the Cinderella of 
planning, ignored by most, for most of the time’.6 Recently however, Welwyn Hatfield 
Council, were faced with the case of Beesley.7 In 2000, the Local Planning Authority (LPA 
hereafter) granted Beesley planning permission to build a barn on green belt land, with the 
condition it would be used as agricultural storage. Beesley built what resembled the exterior 
of a barn; the interior however, was a three bedroom house.8 In 2002 Beesley and his family 
moved into the barn, they lived there for four continuous years and in 2006 applied for a 
certificate of lawfulness of existing use or development (CLEUD hereafter).9  In his 
application Beesley ingeniously relied on s.171B(2),10 stating there had been a material 
change of use; a storage barn to a residential dwelling, which took place four years prior. 
Subsequently, an application for a CLEUD was made to certify the building as lawful and 
immune from enforcement action. Consequently, the barn ought to be immune from 
enforcement action and therefore, he made an application for a CLEUD to certify the 
building as lawful.   
 
5 Martin Edwards “Planning Case update” [2012] J.P.L Issue 4, 374-395, 374 Martin Edwards (n 25) 379 
6 Neil Cameron QC “Enforcement of Planning Law – some Recent Issues” [2010] J.P.L, 11, 1397 -1405, 1397 
Neil Cameron (n 10) 1397 
7 Beesley (n 1)  
8 -- “Couple lose four year battle over £500,000 home they hid inside this barn” (2011) 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1374193/Couple-lose-battle-500-000-home-hid-inside-barn.html - 
accessed 5th November 2015 
9 S.191 of T&CPA 1990 
10 S.171B(2) of the T&CPA 1990   
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Around the same time, Reigate and Banstead Borough Council alongside the public were left stunned 
when what had previously been bales of straw covered by plastic tarpaulin, was now a 
castle complete with ramparts.11 Fidler12 commenced building work in 2002, but concealed 
the development for four continuous years; working only at night-time and via the disguise 
mentioned above. via a clever disguise, as mentioned above. Additionaly, he only worked on the building at night time. Ironicaly, the LPA visited Fidler with regards to a separate issue and 
failed to notice the castle, but inadvertently took photos of the straw bales.13 Four years 
after completing the building work, Fidler Once building work had finished, Fidler awaited four years before removing removed the disguise, believing he had gained 
immunity. Planning permission could not have been granted retrospectively, because the 
development was on green belt land and therefore would be contrary to the National 
Planning Policy Framework (NPPF hereafter).14 Subsequently, Tthe LPA therefore served an enforcement 
notice, requiring demolition.15 Planning permission could not have been granted 
substantially complete for four years and therefore ought to be immune from enforcement 
action under s.171B(1).17 
In both cases, the LPA's appeared to be cornered by the unequivocal wording of 
s.171B.18 Additionally, the Court of Appeal (CA hereafter) had previously ruled, in the case of 
Arun District Council v First Secretary of State,19 that the intentions of the person applying 
for a CLEUD, are irrelevant, even if the application is dishonest.20 The fact ‘dishonesty’ did 
not stop the four- year rule from operating, would undoubtedly encourage the 
 
11  --“Timeline: Farmer’s ‘hidden castle’ battle” (November, 2015) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-surrey-
394585555 - accessed 21st December 2015  
12 Fidler (n 2) 
13 -- “Timeline: Farmer’s ‘hidden castle’ battle” (n 11)  
14 Department for Communities and Local Government “National Planning Policy Framework” (2012) Ministerial 
foreword 11 part 9  
15 Reigate and Banstead Borough Council served Fidler 6 enforcement notices – requiring various parts of the 
development to be demolished  
16 Department for Communities and Local Government “National Planning Policy Framework” (2012) Ministerial 
foreword 11 part 9  
17 Robert Fidler of Honeycrock Farm, Axes Lane, Salford, Surrey, RH1 5QL - Inspectorate Decision (7th May 
2008) APP/l3625/C/07/2036100; 171B(1) of the T&CPA 1990  
18 S.171B of the T&CPA 1990  
19 Arun District Council v First Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1172 para 35-36 
unscrupulous developer to try his luck;21 as demonstrated by Beesley and Fidler.22. Clearly 
Evidently, a substantial loophole existed, which if ignored, would be detrimental to the 
public’s confidence in the system; the floodgates would be open, allowing individuals to 
exploit the law.23 Additionally, authorities would need to look carefully at every 
development:, external inspections alone would be fruitless, because as demonstrated 
external appearances can be highly misleading.24 LPA's would need to be alert to the 
possibility of deception in almost every development.25  
The four- year rule originated from the Carnwath report26, which argued that a breach of 
planning control could not have caused harm if the LPA failed to take enforcement action 
within a timely manner.27 For the majority of cases, the time limits provide ample time to 
discover breaches of planning control.28 However, it would be unrealistic to say no harm had 
been caused simply because the LPA omitted to take enforcement action. as tThere are 
various reasons why LPA’s remain unaware of a breach until time has expired:;29 neighbours 
may resist complaining, onlookers may be unaware the development is unlawful;, the 
development may be in a remote locations with no overlooking properties; and lastly, the 
focus of this article, when the developer may have sets out with the intention to conceal the 
development. Ideally, LPA’s would carry out routine inspections of every development they 
 
20 Martin Goodall “Mr Fidler’s Castle” (November, 2015) <http://planninglawblog.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/mr-
fidlers-castle.html> accessed 17th December 2015 
21 Christopher Barclay, Chris Sear, Wendy Wilson ‘Localism Bill: Committee Stage Report’ (Research Paper 
11/32, House of Commons Library, 12 April 2011) 40 from PBC Deb 1 March 2011 c672 c726 (Jack Dromey) 
<http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP11-32/RP11-32.pdf> accessed 20th October 2015  
22 Beesley (n 1) and Fidler (n 2)  
23 Martin Edwards (n 5) 379 
24 Beesley CA (n 1) 53 (Richard LJ)  
25 Ibid 35 
26 Robert Carnwath report to Secretary of State on “Enforcing Planning Control” (HMSO, February 1989) para 3.2 
(as cited in Richard Humphreys QC “20 years of the 10 year period for enforcement: time for reform?” [2011] 
J.P.L, 5, 522-526, 522) it is not possible to access a copy of the original report; Planning and Compensation Act 
1991 (now subsumed within the T&CPA); section 4 of the 1991 Act introduced s.171B into T&CPA 1990 
27 Humphreys (Ibid) 522  
28 Claire Fellows “Establishing Lawfulness by Deception” [2010] J.P.L, 8, 965-969, 968 
29 For more on this see: Humphreys “20 years…” (n 26) 523 
grant permission for to (although notably that would not help in cases similar to Fidler30, where 
no application for planning was made). However, few, if any LPA's carry out systematic 
checks of their area, mostly due to lack of resources and recent government cuts.31 
Accordingly, both LPA’s endeavoured to challenge the cases to close the loophole and 
prevent the floodgates opening. 
2a) Judicial Reaction to Beesley32… 
Welwyn Hatfield Council sparked the start of their battle when they refused to grant 
Beesley a CLEUD.33 However, in light of Arun,34 it was not surprising leave to appeal was 
granted. On appeal to the High Court (HC hereafter), the council contested the case on the 
grounds that deceit should invalidate the reliance on the four- year rule.35 Collins J, likened 
Beesley’s action to fraud, as he had concealed the full extent of the development from the 
outset; had he been honest, planning permission would never have been granted. For that 
reason, the HC agreed with the council and quashed the appeal.36 
The technical reasoning behind the judgement is rather puzzling;37 it was based on the 
argument there had been no change in use, meaning s.171B(2) did not apply.38 Collins J 
argued the barn went from a nil use to a residential use and therefore no change had 
occurred.39  Beesley on the other hand, argued the material change of use was from a storage 
barn to a residential dwelling.  Collins J however, argued the barn went from a nil use to a 
the requirements of s.171B(2). The HC however, were not convinced, nevertheless it did not 
 
30 Fidler (n 2)  
31 Christopher Barclay, Wendy Wilson ‘Localism Bill: Planning and Housing Bill 126 2010/11’ (Research Paper 
11/03, House of Commons Library, 11 January 2011) 29 from HC Deb 19 June 2007 cc375-9WH 
<http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/RP11-02.pdf> accessed 20th October 2015  
32 Beesley (n 1) 
33 Alan Beesley of Northaw Brook Meadow, Coopers Land Road, Northaw, Potters Bar, Hertfordshire, EN6 4FB – 
Inspectorate Decision (3rd June 2008) APP/C1950/X/07/2054801  
34 Arun (n 18)  
35 Beesley HC (n 1)  
36 Ibid 36 (Collins J)  
37 -- Current Topics “Established Use by Deception” [2010] J.P.L, 1, 2-4, 3 
38 Beesley HC (n 1) 25 (Collins J)  
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technical concept, which is and arguably ‘grasping at straws’.;42 Ccounsel for Beesley warned 
Collins J about twisting the law in favour of the LPA,.43  Collins Jhe defended his judgement stating, 
fraud should only ever succeed if the statute specifically provides for such a conclusion,44 
which in this case it did not. 
  Although it is, perhaps difficult to understand the logic underpinning his judgement, 
namely the nil change in use, only a purist would criticise the decision.45 Collins J continued, 
suggesting obtaining planning permission by deception could amount to a criminal offence 
and any financial gain could be clawed back under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA 
hereafter);46; these comments were however The HC’s judgement was ‘“a straw in the 
wind’”;47 highlighting the potential precedent for future cases.  
Nevertheless, leave was granted to the CA48 where, surprisingly, the council failed to 
advance any legal argument precluding Beesley from relying on the time limits. They failed 
to direct the Court to fundamental principles of public policy which courts must apply when 
interpreting legislation.49 Principles such as; statutory provision cannot be used as ‘“an 
engine to fraud’” and the law should serve the public interest.50 These principles are widely 
 
39 Ibid  
40 Ibid  
41 Beesley (n 3) 
42 -- “Established Use by Deception” (n 36) 3 
43 Ibid 4 
44 Beesley HC (n 1) 37 (Collins J)  
45 Martin Edwards “Commentary: R (on the application of Welwyn Hatfield Council) v Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government and Beesley [2009] EWHC 966 (Admin)” [2010] J.P.L, 3 352- 361, 361 
46 Beesley HC (n 1) 39  
47 Harry Spurr “A Straw in the Wind” (2009) Estates Gazette, 934, 78, 78  
48 Beesley CA (n 1)  
49 Ibid 44-47 (Mummery LJ)  
50 Ibid 46 (Mummery LJ)– Halsbury’s Law of England ‘Statute and Legislative process’ (Volume 96, 2012) see 
part 5(2)(iv)(D) 1152 – Law should serve the public interest  
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applied in various areas of law., Tthere was certainly no compelling reason why they should 
not be applicable in planning.51 
Due to the Council’s omission to raise these arguments, the judges granted leave to 
appeal to the SC.;52 Mummery LJ made it clear the outcome would have been different had 
such argument been put forward. On the contrary, Phil LJ saw ‘“no place for the analysis of 
the morality’;” reinstating Arun.53 He believed s.171B should be objective54.,  Aadditionally 
he asserted that any exception to the time limits ought to be created through a statutory 
scheme.55  
The council successfully relied upon the ‘Connor principle’ in the SC; it states ‘“no one 
shall be allowed to profit from his own wrong’”.56 Although Beesley’s conduct was not 
identifiably criminal nor unlawful, it was a case of positive deception which should not be 
profited from, which ought not to be profited from.57  
Thus, to allow Beesley to rely on the unqualified statutory language would frustrate 
the policy,; indeed, the raison d'être, of the provision.58 It would be unthinkable that 
parliament would have intended the time limits to apply in such circumstances.;59 
Ssomeone who builds without planning permission and deliberately flouts the law cannot be 
put in the same position as if he had been honest.60  The SC distinguished Beesley from 
 
51 Lord Denning in Lazarous Estates Ltd v Beesley [1956] 1 Q.B. 702 713; R v South Ribble BC Housing Benefit 
Review Board Ex p Hamilton (2001) 33 H.L.R 9 26– “legislation should not be construed as to enable a man to 
profit from his own fraud” 
52 Beesley CA (n 1) 37, 47 (Mummery LJ) 36 (Richard LJ) 
53 Arun (n 18)  
54 Beesley CA (n 1) 50 (Phil LJ) 
55 Ibid 52 (Phil LJ) 
56 derived from R v Chief National Insurance Commissioner ex p Connor [1981] QB 758 
57 Beesley SC (n 1) 56 (Lord Mance) 
58 Ibid 63 (Lord Rodger) 
59 Ibid  
60 Sumner v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 37, 29 (Collins J) 
Formatted: Font: Italic
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Arun61 based on the facts; the applicant (in Arun) had not deceived the LPA, she simply 
omitted to comply with a condition of the planning permission.62 In contrast, Beesley had an 
elaborate and sustained plan to deceive the council from the outset; therefore his conduct 
was in a category of its own.63  
Consequently, Beesley could not obtain a CLEUD and the LPA were entitled to take 
enforcement action against the unlawful development. The ultimate principle derived from 
Beesley is that ‘where a person makes a representation, which amounts to positive 
deception, in matters integral to the planning process, enforcement action is permitted 
outside of the time limits’.64   
 2) Judicial Reaction to Fidler65 
Whether Fidler's ruse was ingenious or not is a matter of personal opinion,66 but it is 
unequivocal that both the council, planning inspectorate and HC favoured the LPA,67 
concluding it was not ingenious enough to circumvent the T&CPA.68 The HC believed the 
development was not ‘“substantially complete’”, finding that the enforcement clock had not 
started until the disguise had been removed.69 The judiciary applied Sage v Secretary of 
State70 where their Lordships favoured a holistic approach to the meaning of ‘“substantially 
complete’”, having regard to the totality of the operations which the person originally 
 
61 Arun (n 18)  
62 Arun (n 18) discussed in Beesley SC (n 1) 79 (Lord Brown)– In Arun planning permission had been granted, 
subject to the condition that the extension be used as an additional part to her house and not a separate 
accommodation, she later rented it out to students and failed to inform the council   
63 Beesley SC (n 1) 80 (Lord Brown) 
64 Fidler CA (n 2) 13 (Lord Justice Sullivan) summarised by Michael Purdue “Local Government Ombudsman 
Reports – West Dorset DC 09 000 635 and 09 012 752” [2012] J.P.L, 1, 94 – 98, 94 
65 Fidler (n 2) 
66 Martin Edwards (n 5) 379 
67 Council Enforcement Notices (n 14), Inspectorate Decision (n 16) and Fidler HC (n 2)  
68 Martin Edwards (n 5) 379 
69 Fidler HC (n 2) 26 (Sir Thayne Forbes) 
70 Sage v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions [2003] UKHL 22 
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contemplated and intended to carry out.71 Although the HC accepted ‘“hiding something 
does not take away lawful rights that may accrue due to the passage of time’”,72 when 
applying Sage,73 four years could not have passed because Fidler had always intended to 
remove the straw. Thus it formed an integral part of the development meaning it was not 
“’substantially complete’” until the disguise had been removed.74 Accordingly, the 
enforcement notice was valid as the four- year time limit had not expired prior to it being 
served.75 
This reasoning was said to be “’too clever by half’”;76 because arguably the building 
was complete when the building works finished.77 The only use and purpose of the straw 
bales was to hide the castle.; Tthey provided no benefit to the building operations. Having 
said that, a building would not be considered complete if it was still surrounded by 
scaffolding and hoardings; so perhaps a logical conclusion?.78 Nevertheless, it was presumed 
the CA would overturn the decision79 following Arun.80 At the time Fidler reached the CA, 
the SC had not concluded Beesley,81 consequently the case was temporarily held in 
abeyance.  
 
71 Ibid 6 (Lord Hope)  
72 Fidler HC (n 2) 163 (Sir Thayne Forbes) 
73 Sage (n 68)  
74 Fidler HC (n 2) 26 (Sir Thayne Forbes) 
75 Fidler HC (n 2) 26 (Sir Thayne Forbes) 
76 Goodall “Fidler’s castle…” (n 19)   
77 -- Current Topics “The concealment of Breaches of Planning Control and the Enforcement Time Limits” [2012] 
J.P.L, 2, 99 – 101, 99 
78 Richard Harwood “Commentary: Robert Fidler v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, 
Reigate and Banstead BC [2010] EWHC 143 (Admin)” [2010] J.P.L, 7 915 – 925, 925 
79 Goodall “Fidler’s castle…” (n 19)  
80 Arun  (n 18) 
81 Beesley SC (n 1)  
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In the SC’s judgement of Beesley, Lord Brown stated, obiter dictum, it was plain the 
‘Connor principle’ could be applied to prohibit Fidler to prohibit him from benefitting from 
his dishonest conduct.82 
Consequently, the CA found Fidler’s case to be a ‘“paradigm case of deception, which 
disentitled him from relying on the time limits’”.83. Although Fidler84 had stretched the 
meaning of "’substantial completion’" to breaking point, the ‘“mental gymnastics’” of such 
reasoning was now obsolete,85, as the the case would have failed irrespectively due to 
Beesley.86. It could not be said that the council should have spotted the building earlier; to 
do so would frustrate the purpose of the statute.87. Additionally, it would be a disservice to 
the parties and the paying public to permit further time and money to be spent appealing 
the case.88. Having said that, Fidler spent a further four years battling the enforcement 
decision by applying for planning permission and CLEUDsS; he proposed several arguments89 
however all “’to no avail’”.90. In November 2015, Fidler was sentenced to a three month 
suspended prison sentence for contempt of court; requiring compliance by 6th June 2016.91. 
 
82 Beesley SC (n 1) 81/82 (Lord Brown) 
83 Fidler CA (n 2) 13 (Sulivan J)  
84 Fidler (n 2)  
85 Ashley Bowes “Summaries of Cases: R (on the application of Fidler) v Secretary of State for Communities and 
Local Government) [2011] EWCA Civ 1159” [2012] JPL, Issue 4, 490-49, 490 
86 Ibid  
87 Goodall “Fidler’s castle…” (n 19)  
88 Fidler CA (n 2) 16 (Longmore J)  
89 He had sold the property, he needed to retain the property for agricultural use and lastly the presence of bats 
and newts prevented him from demolishing the building  
90 Goodall “Fidler’s castle…” (n 19) and South Hams DC v Halsey [1996] J.P.L 761 where the CA decided that 
requiring a licence or consent order, in order to comply with an enforcement notice is not an excuse for non-
compliance, unless the licence is denied 
91 Reigate and Banstead Borough Council v Fidler [2015] EWHC 3863 (QB) - The LPA obtained an injunction 
against Fidler under s.187B of the T&CPA, due to his failure and refusal to comply with the court order to 
demolish the unlawful development 
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Finally, in April 2016 Fidler began demolition of the castle;92; demonstrating the power of 
criminal sanctions.   
3) The United Kingdom Government’s response  
Despite the courts successfully closing the loophole, the government felt compelled 
to amend the legislation to ensure that dishonesty was not more profitable than honesty.93 
The government enacted the Localism Act 2011 (LA’11 hereafter) which provided for 
stronger enforcement provisions,94 with the objective of restoring the public’s confidence by 
providing LPA’s additional powers to tackle abuse of the planning system.95 Section 124 
inserted s.171BA-C into the T&CPA.,96 Tthese provisions revised the time limits for 
deliberately concealed breaches of planning control, precluding those from benefitting from 
the enforcement window expiring.97 The government’s reaction is said to be a ‘“quick fix’”98 
solution., Tthey did not await the SC to conclude Beesley99, had they done so, it would be 
evident an adequate remedy had been adopted.   
3.1) How the new provisions, s.171BA-C, will operate 
Section 171BA states LPA’s may apply to a magistrate’s’ court for a planning 
enforcement order (PEO hereafter) where they believe the apparent breaches of planning 
 
92 Martin Goodall “Mr Fidler’s castle comes down” (April 2016) 
<http://planninglawblog.blogspot.co.uk/search?updated-min=2016-01-01T00:00:00Z&updated-max=2017-01-
01T00:00:00Z&max-results=17> accessed 10th April 2016 
93 Scott Stemp “Why Plato is Wrong” (2011) <http://planningblog.org/2011/02/13/why-plato-is-wrong/> accessed 
30/10/2015 
94 These were set out in Conservative Party ‘Open Source Planning Green Paper No.14’ (2010, Conservative 
party) as referred to in Harriet Townsend “In control” (2011)  
<http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6009%3Ain-
control&catid=63%3Aplanning-articles&Itemid=1> accessed 30th March 2016 and Localism Bill HL (Session 
2010-12) [90] Part 5 
95 Department for Communities and Local Government “A plain English guide to the Localism Act” (2011) 13 
96 Section 124 of the Localism Act 2011 inserted Section 171BA-C into the T&CPA 1990 
97 Department for Communities and Local Governments ‘Localism Bill: enforcement package, impact 
assessment’ (January 31, 2011)12 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6028/1829785.pdf> accessed 7th 
November 2015  
98 Emma Hatfield ““A sledge hammer to crack a small nut”: An analysis of section 124 of the Localism Act 2011” 
(2013) C&PL, 1, 48-60, 59/60 at 59/60 
99 Beesley (n 1)  
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control has been deliberately concealed.100 A PEO allows a LPA an additional year101 to seek 
enforcement, despite the fact the enforcement window,; namely four or ten years, has 
expired.102 A LPA has six months to apply for a PEO103 from the date sufficient evidence 
comes to light.104 The court may grant a PEO, if satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the 
apparent breach or any matter constituting to the breach, has (to an extent) been 
deliberately concealed, and having considered all circumstances the court considers it 
‘just’.105 
Effectively, the provision allows LPA’s to take enforcement action beyond the 
limitation period provided they obtain a PEO from the magistrates.  Consequently, the 
incentive to conceal a breach is removed, as no amount of time that passes can be regarded 
as ‘safe’.106  
Arguably, developers could attempt to conceal breaches forever, rather than await 
four years before applying for a CLEUED, as demonstrated by Beesley107 did. In reality, this 
would be impracticable,; the property would be unsaleable, because planning permission 
would be absent and a CLEUD could not be obtained without notifying the LPA.108 
Nevertheless, if the developer was happy to own the development forever, that would not 
be a problem and perhaps a small price to pay.  
 
100 S.171BA(1) of the T&CPA 1990 
101 The enforcement year begins 22 days from the date the court’s decision to make the order(s.171BA(3)), 
unless an application is made to the HC for a statement of case for opinion in respect of the PEO (s.111(1) 
Magistrates Courts Act 1980) then the enforcement year begins with the day the proceedings arising from that 
application are finally determined or withdrawn (s.171BA(4)) of the T&CPA 1990 
102 S.171BA(2) T&CPA 1990 
103 S.171BB(1) T&CPA 1990 
104 The LPA must sign a certificate stating the date that sufficient evidence came to light and that certificate is 
conclusive evidence of that fact (s.171BB(2)); unless the contrary is proven (s.171BB(3)) 
105 S.171BC(1) T&CPA 1990  
106 Optima Legal “Concealing Breaches – Uncertainty in Planning Enforcement” (2013) 
<https://360.optimalegal.co.uk/news-insights/insights/concealing-breaches-uncertainty-planning-enforcement> 
accessed 5th May 2015 
107 Beesley (n 1)  
108 David Merson “Concealment, Enforcement and the Localism Act 2011” (2012) 
<http://davidmerson.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/concealment-enforcement-and-localism.html> accessed 10th 
January 2016 
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The next section will discuss the main criticisms of the new legislation. So what are the 
main criticisms?  
3.2)  What constitutes ‘deliberate concealment’?  
At present, there is no definition or guidance as to what constitutes ‘deliberate 
concealment’..109 Theoretically, ‘deliberate concealment’ could be any breach of planning 
that the landowner knew, or could upon reasonable enquiry, have known to be a breach, 
which they then omitted to remedy.110 Consequently, there is fear the net has been cast too 
wide.111 It has been suggested the provision would be clearer had it been based on 
‘“dishonesty or fraud’”112 and focused on the the mental state of the person at the time of 
the breach.113  
The literal definition of the term is a ‘“conscious or intentional action of hiding 
something or preventing it from being known’”.114 Arguably, Fidler would certainly fall 
within the literal definition; his positive actions were disguising the development, with straw 
bales and tarpaulin, and carrying out building works at night time to avoid detection.115  
Beesley on the other hand, However, it is arguable Beesley would not fall under the 
literal definition as he made no positive act to conceal the breach, he merely deceived the 
council as to the development’s extent.116 Conversely, it is unlikely Beesley would have 
 
109 S.171BC of the T&CPA 1990  
110 Christine de Ferrars Green “Briefing 2012: Concealment of breaches of planning control” (2012, Mills & 
Reeve) 1 <http://www.mills-reeve.com/files/Publication/e5bf71fd-4953-4a47-b31e-
6aaa178c9c97/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c97f5c6e-b9f5-4f3b-9a75-
487873d32f80/Concealment%20of%20breaches%20of%20planning%20control%20-%20February%202012.pdf> 
accessed 13th September 2015   
111 Hatfield “sledge hammer…” (n 96) 51 
112 Ibid 
113 Scott Stemp “To Infinity and Beyond” (2011) <http://planningblog.org/2011/02/21/to-infinity-and-beyond/> 
accessed 30th October 2015 
114 “Deliberate” -- Oxford Dictionary (undated) 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deliberately?q=deliberately)> and “Concealment” -- Oxford Dictionary 
(undated) <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/concealment?q=concealment)> both accessed 20th October 
2015 
115 Fidler Inspectorate (n 16) 12 
116 Beesley HC (n 1) 5– Beesley admitted that he set out with the intention of building a residential dwelling  
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chosen the external appearance of a storage barn, had he not needed to conceal the use, 
that evidence alone may be; therefore it could potentially be considered sufficient.117  
AccordinglyEvidently, if the literal definition was adopted the application would be 
controversial and would not lead to definitive answers. The purpose of the provision would 
be defeated as conduct affiliated to Beesley’s, such as omissions, would debatably not be 
sufficient.118 Whether omissions are amount to ‘deliberate concealment’ sufficient is a 
debated topic  which is yet t to be settled.119   
3.3) Does the threat of enforcement action now last forever?  
Another area of criticism surrounds the uncertainty the provision brings. The ability 
to take enforcement action outside the time limits leads to the question, when does the 
enforcement period now end, or does it last forever? DisputablyDebatably, the time limits 
have been removed entirely, something that is certainly not desirable,120 particularly as 
enforcement action poses a significant threat to developers and notably prospective 
purchasers. Time limits are imposed to provide certainty to both the conveyancing and 
planning system; the justification is that they provide LPA’s ample time to take action.121 
Yet, the only time limit mentioned is regarding a PEO; namely that it needs to be sought 
within six months from the date the LPA discovered the breach;122 irrespective of whether 
that is five, ten or, twenty  or five years later. As some now say, the time limit for enforcement is “’to 
infinity and beyond!’”123  
 
117 Beesley (n 1) and Fidler (n 2)  
118 Hatfield “Sledge hammer…” (n 96) 51 
119 See the case of Carol Jones of Land at Woodend, Crown East Lane, Lower Broadheath, Worcester, WR2 
6RH – Inspectorate Decision (6th September 2012) APP/J1860/C/12/2174258 
120 HL Deb 19 July 2011 Vol. 729, col. 1304 per Baroness Gardner of Parker at [1305] – made it clear that she 
did not feel the time limits should be removed entirely  
121 R. Card, J. R. Murdoch and S. Murdoch “Real Estate Management Law” (2nd edn, OUP, 2011) 715 
122 s.171BB(1) of the T&CPA 1990 
123 Stemp “To Infinity…” (n 111) 
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The Law Society disagreed with the provisions entirely., Ttheir objections stemmed 
from the argument that limitation periods are necessary to provide certainty.124 Their three 
main arguments were;: a) memories fade the longer time passes, b) certainty is vital for 
prospective purchasers and c) rights ought to be lost if not asserted promptly.125  
3.3a) Memories fade 
The Law Society’s first argument is as time passes, memories fade and consequently, 
evidence is lost. This is particularly problematic Especially today, as we move towards a 
system of e-conveyancing126 where paperless transactions mean physical evidence is 
absent.127 Thus, proving a breach of planning control had been deliberately concealed years 
previously would become progressively more harder. difficult. P Various problems may be 
faced, such as: properties may have changed hands, the individual responsible may be 
untraceable and evidence may have been destroyed due to council’s retention periods 
expiring.  There is also the argument that developers would simply not apply for a CLEUD 
and therefore remain undetected for longer, which will be discussed later.128  
3.3b) Prospective purchasers  
Certainty is a key part of planning control129 and precise time limits are vital to 
provide a clear understanding of when potential liability ceases.130 The removal threatens 
the clarity and certainty they provide the conveyancing process.,131 as LPA’s must now 
consider whether a breach has been deliberately concealed, not just whether the relevant 
 
124 The Law Society, Localism Bill Parliamentary Brief (June 7, 2011) Pt 5, cl.109. 
125 Ibid 
126 -- “The implementation of e-conveyancing in England and Wales” (2015) 
<http://www.fridaysmove.com/implementation-e-conveyancing-england-and-wales/126> - accessed 30th March 
2016 – also – “E-conveyancing portal to begin rollout today” (2015) <http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/practice/e-
conveyancing-portal-to-begin-rollout-today/5049004.fullarticle> accessed 30th March 2016  
127 Law Society Brief (n 247) cl.109 (as cited in Hatfield “Sledge Hammer…” (n 96) 55) 
128 Merson “Concealment…” (n 106)  
129 A. Bowes, "Potential restrictions on a legal right to development" (2011) 8 J.P.L. 994-1004, 994  
130 Hatfield “Sledge hammer…” (n 96) 55 
131 Planning and Compensation Act 1991 (now subsumed within the T&CPA); section 4 of the 1991 Act 
introduced s.171B into Town &Country Planning Act 1990 
limitation period expired.132 Inviting such uncertainty could have a chilling effect on the 
property market,;133  resulting in further costs and time for solicitors and lenders, as more 
vigorous checks would need to be carried out to ascertain the full planning history.134 
The government were asked to clarify how far liability would spread, but so far they 
have failed to do so.135. Planning permission runs with the land rather than the owner, 
therefore, following that reasoning, liability for a breach of planning control would also run 
with the land.136. An enforcement notice may be served on any person who has an interest 
in the land, irrespective of whether they were responsible for the breach of planning 
control.137 Accordingly, prospective purchasers could be held liable for a planning breach 
they were not a party too.138. The general consensus however, is that the power to take 
enforcement action outside of the time limits will only be exercised in the worst cases of 
concealment.139 There is hope therefore, that the breach would become apparent prior to 
selling.    
 A safety-net for bona fide purchasers for value of a legal estate without notice,140 
would be the standard of care solicitors and conveyancers owe to their clients.141 A solicitor 
 
132 Frank Smith “Planning enforcement changes – deliberate concealment” (2012) 
<http://www.willans.co.uk/news/article/planning_enforcement_changes_deliberate_concealment/> - accessed 5th 
May 2015 
133 The Law Society "Government amends planning enforcement regime in response to Law Society warning - 
but doesn’t go far enough” (August, 2011, Law Society Press Release) (as cited in Hatfield “Sledge Hammer…” 
(n 27) 55) 
134 Ibid   
135 HL Deb (n 118) 1304 (Lord Taylor) 
136 Department for Communities and Local Government ‘Circular 11/95: Use of Conditions in Planning 
Permission’ (2006) 4.2 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7715/324923.pdf>  accessed15th 
October 2015  
137 Section 172 of the T&CPA 1990 
138 Department for Communities and Local Government (n 134) 
139 HL Deb (n 118) 1304 (Lord Taylor) 
140 The bona fide purchaser for value of the legal estate without notice, otherwise known as “equity’s darling” – 
John McGhee and Edmund Snell “Snell’s Equity” (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) Part 1, Chapter 4, Section 
4-018] – argued by Bowes “Potential restriction…” (n 127) 997 
141 Negligence - Duty of Care – Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 – professionals owe a higher standard 
of care - Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118- “reasonable skill and care” 
(McNair J)  
or conveyor would have a duty to investigate the planning history, in the absence of the 
required permission, a solicitor ought to check whether a CLEUD exists, if absent the client 
or mortgagee must be advised as to the possibility of it being unauthorised. Failure to do so 
could allow the client to sue the solicitor for professional negligence.142 However, that does 
nothing to reinstate any degree of certainty.143 The prudent purchaser should still remain 
cautious,144 as even with the recourse of suing the solicitor, compensation would arguably 
not suffice if the PEO required demolition of the dwelling.145 
The only real comfort is the fact magistrates may only grant a PEO when it is ‘“just’”, in 
regard to all circumstances.146 Thus, logic suggests it would not be fair to take enforcement 
action against the bona fide purchaser who was not party to the breach of planning 
control.147 Having said that,  However, the planning regime is a codified system designed to 
operate in the public interest.148 Presumably therefore, if the unauthorised development 
caused harm, it would inevitably be in the public interest to take enforcement action, 
irrespective of who was responsible for the breach. Consequently, it remains to be seen 
what would happen if the property changed hands.  
The government are yet to clarify this issue, possibly because of the problems they 
could face. Notably however, if enforcement action could only be taken against the owner, 
shrewd developers would simply transfer the property in order to bypass liability. As 
demonstrated by Fidler,,149 he claimed he had transferred the property to a third party and 
 
142 Solicitors Act 1947 see Schedule 1A and Solicitors Regulations Act Code of Conduct 2011 – example Turner 
v Eversheds [2007] All ER (D) 108 (Feb) 
143 Stemp “To Infinity…” (n 111) 
144 Hatfield “Sledge hammer…” (n 96) 53 
145 Stemp “To Infinity…” (n 111)  
146 S.171BC(1)(b) of the T&CPA 1990 
147 Bona fide purchaser (n 138)  
148 NPPF (n 15) 47, para 207 
149 Fidler (2015) (n 89) 
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therefore could not comply with the notice. The judge however, was unsatisfied that the 
transfer had any legal effect but, in any event, it would not suffice as a reason for non-
compliance.150 Having said that,Although noticeably, Fidler’s151 enforcement notice had 
been served several years before he claimed to he had transfered the property, it remains 
to be seen what would happen if the property had changed hands before the LPA became 
aware of the breach. 
3.3c) Should rights be lost if not exercised?   
The Law Society’s third argument was those that do not enforce their rights should 
lose them;152 developing on the suggestion, harm could not have been caused if 
enforcement action had not been exercised within the time limits.153 While there is some 
truth in the ‘“use it or lose it’” rationale, it is possibly the weakest of the three arguments. 
The public are at the heart of the planning system;154; if expiration of time rewarded 
dishonest and fraudulent acts, the public’s confidence would be lost.155 Often these cases 
are in remote locations or, as with Fidler,156 hidden until the relevant limitation period expires. 
Therefore it cannot be just to say the LPA should lose their rights.157 
An incidental issue is the concern regarding compliance with the European Convention 
on Human Rights.158 However, many believe this not to be an issue.159 Currently, there have 
been zero challenges and limited discussion regarding this. Conversely, extending limitation 
 
150 Ibid at para [17] where Fidler tried to claim he no longer owned the property, he failed to convince the judge 
that the property had been legally transferred to a third party but even if it had, it would not be a reason for non-
compliance 31 (Dove J) 
151 Fidler (n 2)  
152 Law Society Brief (n 122) at cl.109 (as cited in Hatfield “Sledge Hammer…” (n 96) 55) 
153 Humphreys“20 years…” (n 26) 522 
154 Plain english guide??– Para 49 page 14 
155 Hatfield “Sledge hammer…” (n 96) 58 
156 Fidler (n 2)  
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periods is not a new concept, it is tried and tested in various areas;160 often in criminal 
matters. Therefore it would seem unlikely to become an issue.  
An incidental issue is one regarding compliance with the European Convention on 
Human Rights.161 There is a threat that one’s Article 8, right to a private life,162 could be 
interfered with. There may be cases where a family have occupied a property for years, 
completely unaware that a breach of planning had occurred prior to them acquiring the 
property. In those cases, if a PEO was served on the property, it is likely that they would 
have a strong article 8 claim, albeit, a court would be unlikely to grant a PEO n those 
circumstances. Consequently, , many believe this not to be an issue.163 Currently, there have 
been zero challenges and limited discussion regarding this. Conversely, extending limitation 
periods is not a new concept, it is tried and tested in various areas;164 often in criminal 
matters. Therefore it would seem unlikely to become an issue.  
 
3.4) Jurisdiction in the magistrates’ court 
There are various concerns relating to the involvement of magistrate’s’ courts. It has 
been expressed the magistrates’ court is ‘“not a suitable forum in which to argue the 
technicalities of planning legislation’”.165 Accordingly, there is apprehension as to whether 
 
157 Humphreys“20 years…” (n 26) 522 
158 European Convention of Human Rights – implemented into United Kingdom’s legislation through the Human 
Rights Act 1998 
159 Stemp “To Infinity…” (n 111) 
160 Ibid  
161 European Convention of Human Rights – implemented into United Kingdom’s legislation through the Human 
Rights Act 1998 
162 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Right to respect for private and family life  
163 Stemp “To Infinity…” (n 111) 
164 Ibid  
165 Carnwath (n 25) (as cited in Hatfield “Sledge Hammer…” (n 96) 59)  
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magistrates and their advisers are equipped to make such decisions, especially in contrast to 
LPA’s and inspectorates.166  
 It has been suggested the planning industry has taken a step back by reverting to 
using magistrates in this area; especially given that there are now even more grey areas in 
planning than ever before.167 There is a risk of decisions being tainted by personal opinions 
and concern that a consistent approach will not be provided, which ultimately effects the 
overriding test of fairness.168 Requiring a magistrate to consider whether a decision is just is 
arguably an implicit recognition of the potential risk for an injustice to occur.169 Many 
questions why  LPA’s and planning inspectorates, those specifically equipped with the 
knowledge and expertise, could not continue to deal with enforcement, especially given 
that PEO’s involve technical questions and complex scenarios.170 Additionally, they would 
provide a more homogeneous approach, as they are supported by a body of reported 
decisions and circulars.171 
4) The Beesley Principle v s.171BA-C of the T&CPA 
The new provisions seem powerless at curbing unlawful developments.; Hhad the 
government awaited the SC to conclude Beesley,172 they would have seen the fundamental 
 
166 Royal Town Planning Institute ‘The Localism Bill: RTPI Issue Briefing Enforcement’ (June 29, 2011)16 
<http://www.rtpi.org.uk/media/8262/RTPI-Issue-Briefing-Enforcement-v2-29-06-11.pdf> accessed 18th December 
2015 4 para16  
167 Ibid  
168 Nicholas Dobson “Localism Bill does not rule out bias” (November 2015) Law Society Gazette - 
<http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/legal-updates/localism-bill-does-not-rule-out-bias/5051848.article>  accessed 
10th January 2016 
169 National Association for Planning Enforcement - Memorandum submitted by NAPE (L116) (February 2011) 
(NAPE Memo) as referred to in Simon Pickles “Localism Act 2011: Enforcement” (2011, Landmark Chambers) 23 
<http://www.landmarkchambers.co.uk/userfiles/documents/resources/Enforcement_-_Simon_Pickles.pdf > 
accessed 15th October 2015 
170 Carnwath (n 25) (as cited in Hatfield “Sledge Hammer…” (n 96) 59) 
171 There is ample guidance issued by the Department for Communities and Local Government, Planning 
Inspectorate Decisions, Journal of Planning & Environment Law and newsletter to LPA  
172 Beesley (n 1) -LA’11 s.171BA-C came into force on the 15th November 2011 but the bill was put to parliament 
on the 13th December 2010– SC concluded Beesley on the 6th April 2011 
principles of law and justice were perfectly apt to close the loophole.173 The SC relied on two 
principles:; firstly, law must be applied in the public interest174 and secondly, no person 
should be permitted to profit from their own wrongdoing; known as the ‘Connor 
principle’.175 Both public policy (the Beesley principle) and s.171BA-C address the same 
problem. Thus it is questionable, why the unnecessarily complicated process of applying for 
a PEO was required;176 hence the question, which solution is preferred and how will they 
operate together?  
4.1) Conflict or compatibility?  
To answer such questions, it is necessary to determine whether the statutory 
amendments overrode the Beesley principle. The case of Jackson v Secretary of State,177 
factually similar to Beesley, considered the relationship between the two solutions.178  
Jackson deceived the LPA by changing the use of an agricultural building to one of a 
residential use, omitting to obtain planning permission.179 The LPA refused Jackson’s 
application for a CLEUD upon expiration of the four- year time limit, by relying on the 
Beesley principle. Jackson appealed, arguing that the Beesley principle had been supplanted 
by the PEO procedure.180 
 
173 Emma Hatfield “Under wraps: enforcing concealed planning breaches after the Localism Act” [2013] Solicitors 
Journal -  
<http://www.solicitorsjournal.com.libezproxy.bournemouth.ac.uk/property/land/under-wraps-enforcing-concealed-
planning-breaches-after-localism-act> - accessed 2nd November 2015 
174 Halsbury's Laws (n 48) 
175 Ibid and Beesley SC (n 1) (Lord Mance) cited various cases; Connor (n 54); Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fun 
Life Assoc [1892] 1 Q.B. 147 
176 Martin Goodall “Concealed development and the Connor principle” [2012] – 
<http://planninglawblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/concealed-development-and-connor.html> accessed 5th May 
2015 
177 Jackson v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 1246 also known as 
Bonsall v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWCA Civ 1246 
178 Jackson v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 20 (Admin) 
179 Ibid  72/77 (Holgate J) 
180 Ibid 52 (Holgate J)  
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When determining the relationship, the court gave attention to the differences 
between the two approaches.181 Parliament legislated only with regards to ‘‘deliberate 
concealment’’; the Beesley principle however, is of much wider application, such as 
‘“bribery, coercion or menaces’”.182 The LA’11 was being deliberated when the SC concluded 
Beesley, consequently parliament could have amended s.171BA-C so the provision would 
replace the Beesley principle, however they neglected to do so;.183 pPerhaps due to the gap 
this would have left.184 Accordingly, both the HC185 and the CA186 concluded the PEO 
procedure simply gave LPA’s additional enforcement powers; a result consistent with the 
legislative object of strengthening their powers.187 
In addition, Jackson questioned the legal adequacy of the tests Beesley 
established.188 Jackson accepted he had satisfied the Beesley criteria; positive deception in 
matters integral to planning, which were directly intended to, and did, undermine the 
operation of that process.189 However, he argued his conduct was “’less obviously 
shocking’”190 than Beesley’s, thus he did not meet the ‘“exceptionality test’” referred to by 
Lord Brown.191 Holgate J however, stated the only test to satisfy was the criteria, there was 
not an “’exceptionality test’.192  Consequently, Jackson is extremely valuable clarifying the 
application of Beesley and clearly stating LPA’s may decide which route to adopt.193 
 
181 Ibid  
182 Beesley SC (n 1) 55 
183 Jackson CA (n 170) - the case was conjoined with the Bonsall v Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government [2014] EWHC 2022 (Admin) 52 (Richards LJ)  
184 Jackson HC (n 171) 52 (Holgate J) 
185 Ibid  
186 Jackson CA (n 170)  
187 ibid 52 (Richards LJ) 
188 Jackson HC (n 171) 66 (Holgate J) 
189 Beesley SC (n 1) 56 (Lord Mance) 
190 Jackson HC (n 171) 67 quoting the case of Nigel Jackson of Sutton Springs, Bullington Lane, Scotney, 
Hampshire, S021 3RA - Inspectorate Decision (2nd May 2014) APP/L1765/C/13/2201138 para 62 
191 Ibid 84 (Lord Brown) 
192 Jackson HC (n 171) 68 
193 -- “Case Comment: Jackson v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] EWHC 20 
(Admin) (2015)” J.P.L, 7, 830-846, 846 
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4.2) A comparison of the two approaches 
Upon concluding PEO’s are an additional remedy;194 it prompts the question, which 
will be preferred.   
Some argue that the Beesley principle is an exception to the statutory time limit, 
however others however, advocate it was merely interpreting the law in harmony with 
principles of public policy.195 Had the SC adopted the literal interpretation, the public’s 
confidence would have been seriously damaged;196 arguably leaving their Lordships no 
choice but to fill the gap in the law.197 
It has however, been argued any changes to legislation should be expressly 
authorised by parliament and that applying principles merely to achieve a fairer result, was 
an impermissible exercise of the judicial function.198 The SC however, made reference to the 
fact statutes have been ‘“subject to implied limitations based upon principles of public 
policy’”199 for years, therefore planning legislation is not immune from such 
interpretation.200  
  The criticism of ‘judge made law’, is that it creates uncertainty and capriciousness, as 
the parameters are established on a case by case basis.201 The criticism is however equally 
applicable to s.171BA-C,202 especially given the lack of definition and ambiguity of 
“’deliberate concealment’.” Arguably, making s.171BA-C no more effective than the Beesley 
 
194 Beesley SC (n 1)  
195 Jackson CA (n 170) 42 (Richards LJ) elaborating on Jackson HC (n 171) 53 (Holgate J)  
196 “all enactments are presumed to be for the public benefit” – Oliver Jones “Bennion on Statutory Interpretation” 
(6th edn, Lexis Nexis, 2007) section 264 
197 Clive Moys “Has the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 stood the test of time?” [2016] J.P.L, 5, 447-456, 
455 
198 Pioneer Aggregates (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1985] A.C. 132, 141 
199 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex p Puttick [1981] Q.B. 767, 773 
200 Beesley SC (n 1) 50 
201 Current Topics “Established use…” (n 36) 100 
202 S.171BA-C of the T&CPA 1990  
principle.203 Additionally, there are strict safeguards and stringent guidelines that courts 
must adhere to when applying public policy principles.204 Conversely, s.171BA-C205 is new, 
thus lacking sufficient guidance. Furthermore, there is the concern regarding its application 
in the magistrate’s’ court; a body ill-equipped to deal with such complexities.206. 
Subsequently, the Beesley principle ensures certainty remains,207 whilst the criticism 
regarding s.171BA-C concerns the lack of certainty.208  
The Beesley principle may also be preferred for an additional reason based on , 
namely money and time.  Interpreting the law in accordance with public policy is expedient 
and arguably much easier than obtaining a PEO from the magistrates’ court.209 Refusing an 
application for a CLEUD or issuing an enforcement notice outside of the time limits, in 
reliance on the Beesley principle, incurs no additional costs. Applying to the magistrates’ 
court however, incurs costs and requires valuable time from council officers.  
Subsequently, it is fair to predict LPAs’ will rely upon the Beesley principle, and 
sidestep the application for a PEO;210 opting for the cheapest, quicker and more predictable 
option.    
4.3) Alternative solutions / remedies to s.171BA-C  
Subsequent to the discussion above, the amended provisions provide no additional 
assistance to the Beesley principle.211 Hence the next question, was s.171BA-C the answer to 
 
203 Ibid and Beesley (n 1)  
204 As shown by the case above; Pioneer (n 191), Puttick (n 192), Connor (n 54) and Lazoutes (n 49) 
205 S.171BA-C of the T&CPA 1990  
206 RTPI Briefing (n 159) 4 para16  
207 Hatfield “Under wraps…” (n 166)  
208 s.171BA-C  of the T&CPA 1990 and Beesley (n 1) - Emma Hatfield “Concealed Development: Did we really 
need Section 124” [2013] J.P.L Issue 1, 19 – 28, 27 
209 Ibid  
210 Martin Goodall “Concealed developments: transitional provisions” (2012) 
<http://planninglawblog.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/concealed-development-transitional.html> - date accessed 5th 
May 2015 
211 Beesley (n 1)  
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close the loophole in the law? Some academics and practitioners have argued alternative 
solutions may have been better.212  
Firstly, the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI hereafter) suggested an alternative 
position was to calculate the time limits from the actual date the LPA became aware of the 
breach.213 The advantages would be that jurisdiction would remain in the appropriate 
forum, namely the LPA and planning inspectorates,; there would be no need to grapple with 
the definition of deliberate concealment and consequently, certainty would remain.214  
Nonetheless, the government did not take the RTPI’s advice on board, perhaps regrettably, 
in light of the wide criticism of s.171BA-C.215  
A similar alternative would have been for the time limits to stop running during any 
period of concealment, the development, if concealed, would therefore never become 
immune.216 This solution would not rely on the magistrates’ court, nor the PEO procedure. 
Albeit, the question ‘what constitutes deliberate concealment’ would remain. Perhaps the 
only problem this approach eradicates, is the involvement of the magistrates’ court.217 
 A further suggestion would be to make enforcement action mandatory, in practice 
however, this would be too rigid.218 Providing LPA’s discretion, allows LPAA’s to take action 
when it is expedient to do so, having regard to their Development Plan and any other 
material considerations.219 If the public feel an LPA has failed in their duty to take 
 
212 Hatfield “Section 124…” (n 201) 20 
213 RTPI Brief (n 159) para 17 
214 Ibid  
215 S.171BA-C of the T&CPA 1990 
216 David Brock and Phillip Kratz “The ten year period for enforcement: is it really time for reform?” [2011] J.P.L 
Issue 8, 1005 -1008, 1005 1005 
217 Ibid  
218 Michael Purdue “Reform of the Enforcement of Planning Control – Where are We Now? [2012] J.P.L, 7, 795 – 
804, 797803 
219 NPPF (n 15) para 207 
enforcement action, they would be able to challenge the decision via judicial review220 or 
make a complaint to the ombudsmen, as they can make recommendations which can be 
extremely influential on LPA’s221.  
Alternatively, Parliament could have strengthened the powers within the T&CPA. LPA’s 
are currently overstretched, due to the lack of funding and manpower.222 At present the 
system of detection relies heavily upon the public;223 it is said to be no more than a game of 
‘Russian roulette’;224 simply a matter of time and chance.225  Accordingly, a prevention 
mechanism would be for LPA’s to carry out systematic checks upon completion and ensure 
full compliance with planning permission conditions,;226 and adopting a proactive approach 
to breaches of planning.227  AdditionallyAs such, it is surprising the LPA in Beesley, did not 
learn of the connections to mains services.228 There should be a cohesive system to allow 
LPA’s to check, investigate and cross reference information with service providers.229 
Consequently, developers are taking advantage and abusing the system.     
A further option, would be to require those applying for planning permission to sign a 
declaration, stating the information they have provided is the truth. It is surprising this is not 
a requirement for planning permission when considering it is required for obtaining a 
 
220 Civil Rules Procedure 1998 SI 1998/3132 Part 54 Judicial Review  
221 Louise Smith “Enforcement of Planning Law” House of Commons Standard Note SN/SC/1579 (26 August 
2014, HC Library) 1  1 
222 Christopher Barclay, Chris Sear, Wendy Wilson ‘Localism Bill: Committee Stage Report’ (Research Paper 
11/32, House of Commons Library, 12 April 2011) 40 from PBC Deb 1 March 2011 c672 c726 (Jack Dromey) 
<http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP11-32/RP11-32.pdf> accessed 20th October 2015 
(Jack Dromey c726) 
223 Hatfield “Section 124…” (n 201) 20 
224 Ibid 
225 Arun (n 18) 36 (Sedley LJ) 
226 Fellows (n 27) 968 
227 -- “Case Comment certificate of existing use – planning permission for barn” [2010] J.P.L, 9, 1095-1106, 1106 
para 5.4 
228 Beesley SC (n 1) 55 
229 Current Topics “The legal consequence of keeping breaches of planning control hidden” [2010] J.P.L, 5, 537 – 
540,539  
CLEUD.;230 Iit would seem peculiar to have such inconsistencies.231 Logic would suggest that if 
a declaration were to be inserted into the T&CPA, LPA’s would be in a stronger position to 
deal with cases like Beesley.232 Firstly, it would make applicants think twice about their 
actions and secondly, it would give rise to the possibility of prosecutions for fraud, as 
discussed below.233  
Jersey’s planning law234 criminalises breaches of planning; ‘if a person knowingly or 
recklessly makes a false statement, the applicant shall be guilty of an offence and liable for 
imprisonment of up to two years and/or a fine’.235 There is no reason why the T&CPA could 
not have a similar provision (as discussed below); the very existence of criminal sanctions 
would deter devious developer’sdevelopers.236   
4.3c) Prosecuting breaches of planning control  
Previously, judges and Parliament have been firmly against the idea of criminalising 
breaches of planning control.237 However, it would appear judges may be returning to the 
idea,; Collins J acknowledged the legislation could contain a provision regarding fraud. He 
continued by expressing ‘“it ought to be carefully considered by those responsible for 
legislation’”.238  
Irrespective of whether the T&CPA is amended to deal with fraudulent acts, there is 
no reason why criminal liability under the Fraud Act 2002 (FA hereafter) could not be 
 
230 S.194 of the T&CPA 
231 Fellows (n 27) 969 
232 Beesley HC (n 1) 32 (Collins J) 
233 If the applicant signed the declaration of truth, which was in fact false or misleading – it could trigger liability 
under the Fraud Act 2006 – Section 2 fraud by false representation or Section 3 fraud by failing to disclose 
information – this is discussed next - Noticeably, this would not assist in cases like Fidler  where developers 
sidestep the planning application stage altogether. 
234 Article 10 of Planning and Building Regulations (Jersey) Law 2002 (as amended) 
235 Ibid  
236 Richard Humphreys QC “Integrity in the Planning System in England: Lacunas But Lessons From a British 
Isle?” [2015] J.P.L, 2 128 – 132, 132; Moys (n 190) 455 
237 Most noticeably Baroness Blatch - HL Deb 17 July 1991 vol 524 col.1301  
238 Beesley HC (n 1) 32 (Collins J) 
triggered. Section 2 states a person is liable, if they dishonestly make a false representation 
and intend to make a gain, for themselves or another, or cause loss to another, by making 
that representation.239 Prosecuting Beesley would appear unequivocal.240 The LPA granted 
Beesley planning permission on the basis of the false and misleading representation that the 
barn would be used for storage.241 Beesley intended to make a gain for himself, that being 
the increase in value to the land, consequently satisfying the criteria for prosecution. The 
LPA however omitted to bring a criminal prosecution, thus the judges’ comments were 
merely obiter dictum;,242 albeit insightful nonetheless.243 
In the event of a criminal conviction, the LPA could have recourse to the POCA, 
recovering the profits made.244 It wasis confirmed by R v Del Basso (Luigi),245 that it is 
possible to seek a confiscation order in planning prosecutions. Previously, it had been 
suggested it was an abuse of process to allow the POCA to be used for planning breaches, 
this argument was however rejected by the CA.246 The judges endorsed the view ‘those that 
flout the law are in the same position as thieves, fraudsters and drug dealers’ irrespective of 
the area of law.247 Recovering profits from breaches could eradicate the possibility of 
landowners taking calculated risks,248 reminding unscrupulous developers that crime does 
not pay.249  
 
239 Section 2 of the Fraud Act - A representation is false if it is untrue or misleading and the persons knows it to 
be; a representation can be fact or law and could be express or implied 
240 Stemp “Why Plato…” (n 91)  
241 Beesley (n 1)  
242 Beesley SC (n 1) 56 (Lord Mance) 
243 Fellows (n 27) 968 
244 This point was considered by Colins J in Beesley HC (n 1) 39 (Collins J) 
245 R v Del Basso (Lugi) [2010] EWCA Crim 1119 
246 Helen Boniface and Jessica Hickson “A new direction?” (2014) P.L.J 323, 26-28, 27 
247 Del Basso (n 238) 46 
248 Cameron “Enforcement…” (n 6)1401 
249 Ibid 1405 
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Recognisable however, are is the time and costs involved with obtaining a conviction and 
subsequent confiscation orders. This is likely to dissuade many overstretched authorities 
from pursuing such an approach.250  Nevertheless, in cases where proceeds of the crime are 
likely to be substantial, a LPA may find the money attractive.251 In Garland Development v 
Hackney Council252, the court ordered a payment of £700,000 for the non-compliance of an 
enforcement order. This was a record breaking amount of money awarded, of which the 
LPA were entitled to a third of such sum.253 Arguably, this could be a lucrative option.254 Utilising the 
POCA allows the money obtained to be used to repair any harm the development caused, 
either to the environment or the local community.255 It is clear the very existence of criminal 
sanctions would deter deceitful developers.256   
4.4) The effect on CLEUDs  
Another area of uncertainty following s.171BA-C257 is the effect this could have on 
CLEUD’s,258 considering most concealment cases come to light when the landowner applies 
for a certificate upon expiration of four years.259 The critical distinction between 
enforcement action and a CLEUD application is the timing; enforcement action is initiated by 
 
250 Fellows (n 27) 969 
251 Hatfield “Section 124…” (n 201) 23 
252 Yusuf Sarodia, Garland Development v Hackney Council (Snaresbrook Magistrates Court, 30 November 
2015) Case No. S20141016/21  – although it is said the property is yet to be demolished see report by William 
Eichler “Record breaking £700,000 seized from rogue developer in Hackney” (2015) 
<http://www.localgov.co.uk/Record-breaking-700000-seized-from-rogue-developer-in-Hackney/40021>- 
accessed 17th December 2015  
253 See also Danny Beach v Runnymede Borough Council (30 October 2011, Guilford Crown Court) Case No: 
T20110543 wherein Runnymede Borough Council were entitled to a third of the sum of £250,000. 
254 Rebecca Carriage “When enforcement isn’t enough” (2010) 
<http://www.localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3827:when-
enforcement-isnt-enough&catid=63:planning-articles> – accessed 20th February 2016  
255 Stemp “Why Plato…” (n 91)   
256 Humphrey “Integrity…” (n 229) 132; Moys (n 190) 455 
257 S.171BA-C of the T&CPA 1990  
258 S.191 of the T&CPA  
259 As seen with Beesley (n 1), Jackson and Bonsall (n 170) and various cases discussed further below  
the LPA, whereas, a CLEUD application is initiated by the landowner. It is this feature which 
allows the planning system to be abused.260   
 The LA’11 also inserted s.191(3A) into the T&CPA to prevent CLEUD applications 
being successful in three situations; firstly, when the time for applying for a PEO has not 
expired,261 secondly, when a PEO has been applied for but is awaiting a decision,262 and 
thirdly, when the enforcement year is yet to expire.263 In those situations, the LPA have 
grounds to refuse a CLEUD in deliberate concealment cases. These however, are 
“’pending’”264  situations, what if the application itself was the coming to light of evidence, 
could that be sufficient to refuse the application?265  
This question arose in Jackson,266 at the time he made a CLEUD application, the LPA 
were unaware of any deception, so on what grounds could they refuse to grant the 
certificate? The LPA could not rely on s.171BB(1) and (2)267 and set the six month time limit 
for a PEO application running, because at the time they received the application for a CLEUD 
they did not have ‘sufficient evidence’.268 Consequently, the LPA could not rely on any of the 
“’pending’” grounds for refusal as the six month period had not started to run.269 
Accordingly, if the PEO procedure were to be treated as exhaustive, wrongdoers would be 
allowed to continue to use concealment in order to legitimise breaches of planning 
 
260 Jackson HC (n 171) 63 
261 Section 171BA(1) – the 6 months from the date that the LPA came to light of sufficient evidence has not 
expired – as stated in section 191(3A)(a) of the T&CPA 1990  
262 section 191(3A)(b) of the T&CPA 1990 
263 section 191(3A)(c) of the T&CPA 1990 
264 Jackson HC (n 171) at para [46] 
265 Ferrars Green (n 108) 1 
266 Jackson HC (n 171)  
267 S.171BB(1) and (2) of the T&CPA 1990   
268 Jackson HC (n 171) 63 (Holgate J) 
269 Ibid 62 
control.270 Subsequently, the court concluded the Beesley principle was a supplementary 
solution, required to fill this gap in the law.271  
Consequently, developers are unlikely to make CLEUD applications if the breach of 
planning control was deliberately concealed.272 Does that therefore render applications for 
CLEUDS redundant?273 It is suggested CLEUD’s will become an equitable remedy;274 only 
being granted when the applicant “’comes with clean hands’”.275 Such an approach 
however, would be fraught with difficulty, as it would depend on the degree of culpability; 
where would the line be drawn.276 There would be varying levels of wrongdoing, it would be 
difficult to differentiate between someone with “’grubby hands’” as opposed to someone 
with ‘“unclean hands’”.277 With such an extensive range of wrongdoing, it is possible, mere 
ignorance of the law could be compared with conduct akin to Beesley or Fidler.278 Without 
guidance it would be impossible to predict. Whilst consideration of ‘“good faith’” in theory 
acts as a solution, upon closer scrutiny it is problematic.279 
A further area of uncertainty is the LPAs power LPA’s have to revoke a CLEUD,’s upon 
discovering if they discover a statement or document the applicant provided, by the 
applicant,  was false or withheld material information was withheld.280 The concern arises 
with regards to innocent parties who bought the property on the basis of the certificate. 
 
270 Ibid 64 
271 David Bird “Good faith and planning enforcement” (2015) 
<http://localgovernmentlawyer.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22608%3Agood-faith-and-
planning-enforcement&catid=56&Itemid=24> date accessed 4th November 2015 
272 Merson “Concealment…” (n 106)   
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274 Fellows (n 27) 967 
275 McGhee and Snell (n 138) Part 2, Chapter 5, Section 6, 5-010; Portsea Island Building Society v Barclay 
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276 Hatfield “Section 124…” (n 201) 22 
277 Fellows (n 27) 967 
278 Ibid; Beesley (n 1) and Fidler (n 2)  
279 Hatfield “Section 124…” (n 201) 22 
280 Section 193(7)(a) and (b) of the T&CPA 1990  
Several safety-nets have been suggested; firstly there is hope the magistrates’ would not 
consider it just to make an order.281 Secondly, insurance could provide the necessary 
security and protection for innocent purchasers, although, that is a quick fix solution and 
could be unnecessarily expensive.282 There is also concern insurance would not be sufficient 
to cover the risks posed and the only winners are the insurance companies.283 Alternatively, 
it is expected buyers could seek indemnity from the seller, for any future liability for 
enforcement action.284 .Or, there is the potential for a new type of insurance, specifically 
created to cover the risk of CLEUDS’s being revoked.285. That said, uUntil there is guidance 
on the interpretation of the provisions,; those involved in buying, selling and lending in the 
property market, should tread carefully for the foreseeable future.286  
5. Which is applied in practice, the Beesley principle or s.171BA-C?  
In recent years there have been various cases relating to ‘deliberate concealment’, 
this section will analyse how the LPA’s have dealt with the issue, identifying whether they 
favour s.171BA-C or the Beesley principle. 
5.1 Malvern Hills District Council  
Shortly after the implementation of s.171BA-C,287 Malvern Hills DC wereas faced with 
the case of Jones.,288 wherein Pplanning permission had been granted for a garage,. Jones 
however, in fact built a two bedroom house which he disguised by the external façade of a 
 
281 Merson “Concealment…” (n 106)  
282 Not the first time insurance is used as a solution as seen in Cottingham v Attey Bower & Jones [2000] 
P.N.L.R. 557 (Ch D) 
283 Brock and Kratz "The ten year…” (n 209) 1005 
284 Ferrars Green (n 108) 2 
285 Ibid  
286 Optima Legal (n 104)  
287 T&CPA 1990  
288 Malvern Hills District Council: Mrs Jones (n 216)  
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garage.289 Upon discovering the dwelling, the LPA served an enforcement notice on the 
grounds of Beesley,290 despite Jones claiming the four- year rule s had expiredpassed.291 On 
appeal, the enforcement notice was upheld as the planning inspectorate had no doubt that 
‘“as a matter of public policy, people are expected to behave lawfully and a person should 
not benefit from their own wrongs’”292, thus relying on the Beesley principle.  
There are two interesting aspects in this case; firstly, the inspectorate relied upon 
Beesley, not the PEO procedure, concluding the only reason for such an appearance, was to 
evade detection by the LPA.293 Secondly, the inference the inspectorate drew from the 
appellant’s omissions to seek building regulations approval, which she had previously 
sought for another property. He viewed this as sufficient evidence that she had intentionally 
concealed the breach, because she could anticipate that seeking such approval would alert 
the LPA. Consequently, demolition was required within six months.294 
5.2 Broads Authority  
Here, Broads Authority served an enforcement notice upon the Young’s’ after 
discovering a pig-rearing barn was in fact being used as a residential dwelling.295. 
Unscrupulously, the Young’s failed to obtain building regulation approval, to register for 
council tax, the electoral role or an address with Royal Mail. On appeal they argued the only 
explicit ‘“lie’” they had told was when they denied living in the shed to a council officer.296 
 
289 See Neil Watts “Women loses bid to keep house ‘hidden’ in garage” (20120 
“http://www.worcesternews.co.uk/news/9976298.Woman_loses_bid_to_keep_house____hidden____in_garage/ - 
accessed 5th February 2016  
290 Hatfield “Under wraps…” (n 166)  
291 Malvern Hills District Council: Mrs Jones (n 117) para 38 
292 Ibid   
293 Ibid  para 42 
294 Ibid 
295 David and Elizabeth Young of Land adjacent to Heathacre, Hardley Road, Chedgrave, Norfolk, NR14 6BE– 
Inspectorate Decision (24th July 2014) Appeal A: Ref:APP/E9505/C/13/2208559 and Appeal B - 
Ref:APP/E9505/C/13/2208560  
296 Ibid para 34 
Formatted: Font: Italic
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Despite explanations and excuses for their failures, the inspectorate concluded the couple 
had embarked upon an explicit strategy to keep the residential use of the barn a secret from 
the council;297 they had not merely let events unfold in a passive way. Consequently, their 
conduct had deliberately misled the LPA and therefore amounted to deliberate 
concealment.298 Interestingly, the Beesley principle299 continues to be favoured, supporting 
the argument that such it is preferred over s.171B.   
5.3 North Somerset Council  
Thus far, the Beesley principle had been favoured. The first PEO was however 
obtained by North Somerset Council, for an agricultural storage barn disguised as a 
residential dwelling.300 The developer failed to register with both the council tax 
department and Royal Mail, they remaineding registered at their parents’ address for 
electoral purposes.301 These omissions, alongside the deceiving external appearance, were 
considered sufficient to grant a PEO.  
5.4 Brent Council  
Brent Council sought a PEO for an outhouse being rented out for residential use, 
despite planning permission being granted for a gym.302 The failure to apply for residential 
planning permission, inform the post office, provide a separate electricity meter and the 
insertion of a tenancy agreement clause obliging tenants not to pay or register for council 
tax, was sufficient to prove deliberate concealment.s Subsequently, a PEO was granted as 
 
297 Ibid para 35 
298 Ibid para 39 
299 Beesley SC (n 1) 
300 Unknown Defendant v North Somerset Council (North Somerset Magistrates Court, 15 September 2012) 
Case Number 521200520630  
301 Marie- Louise Gray “RTPI Network for Planning Enforcement – NAPE News” December 2012 2  
302 Virendra Patel and Rashmika Patel v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Brent (Hendon 
Magistrates Court, 16 January 2014)  
the developer had satisfied the criteria for deliberate concealment. The outcome was 
regarded as a ‘“fantastic result’”, one which unscrupulous landlords should note.303 
5.5 Summary  
Evidently, both solutions are used in practice. Following the first PEO being obtained, a 
report was written to assist LPA’s in the future. The report found that magistrates did not 
fully understand the reasoning for the procedure. This supports the problems that have 
been highlighted above. Applying the Beesley principle however, does not involve the 
magistrates’ court and therefore sidesteps this issue.304 Having said that, iIt is still difficult to 
predict whether PEO’s will continue to be used, especially given the success of the Beesley 
principle.305  
6. Conclusion  
In response to the loophole Beesley and Fidler exposed, the government responded 
quickly, creating a new procedure for taking enforcement action outside of the relevant 
time period.306 Although, the general concept of s.171BA-C is welcomed, it is considered to 
be a ‘sledge hammer to crack a relatively small nut’.307 The amendments generate an 
extraordinary level of controversy, highlighting the polarised nature of debate about the 
planning system and the inherent conflict that arises.308  
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It is questionable whether the new provisions have created more problems than 
they solved,; rather than close the loophole, it appears to have been ‘left ajar’.309  The most 
serious casualty is the removal of unambiguous limitation periods, thereby damaging 
definitive tests laid down before the 1990 Act.310 It is said to be a ‘shining example of the 
trite observation ‘“hard cases make bad law’”’.311  
The way the government chose to solve the problem has significant disadvantages 
and is has been unnecessarily complicated.312 The provision was ill conceived and places an 
extra burden on already overstretched LPA’s.313 It has long been said  LPAs’ have been 
failing in their enforcement duties, it would appear this still stands today as more and more 
cases are appearing where developers have successfully deceived the LPA.314  It is vital that 
LPA’s ensure developers are complying with the law and make a serious in an attempt to rebuild 
the public’s confidence in the planning system.315  
Despite concerns about importing public policy, one would predict the Beesley 
principle is the best possible way to deal with such cases, based on money, expertise and 
speed. Having said that,  s.171BA-C316 has also proven successful, despite the criticism, and 
although the magistrates are arguably not equipped to deal with such complexities, the 
more PEOs applications for PEO’s there are, the more guidance there will be to assist in the 
magistrates decisions.  
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2011 
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316 S.171BA-C of the T&CPA 1990 
Nevertheless, had the government awaited the SC’s conclusion,317  they would have 
witnessed a much simpler, cheaper and quicker option; interpreting the legislation in 
harmony with public policy.318 Thus, the government’s reaction can undeniably be regarded 
as a ‘“quick fix’”319 solution. It is also said to be entirely disproportionate,320 especially given 
the atypical nature of cases like Beesley and Fidler.321 
Nonetheless, LPA’s now have two solutions to deal with deliberately concealed 
developments, which, despite criticisms, both have been applied successfully prohibiting 
reliance on the expiration of time. Deliberately concealed developments are a 
contemporary issue, with an influx of cases being scrutinised.322 Those responsible are now 
unlikely to seek a CLEUD, so unless LPA’s systematically check every development or receive 
complaints and ‘tip offs’ from the public, it is unlikely they will be discovered. Due to the 
very nature of these cases, it is impossible to know how many devious developers have 
followed in Beesley’s and Fidler’s323 footsteps. Without inspecting every agricultural barn, it 
is impossible to know how many are actually being used as residential dwellings, . 
Aalthough, as case law demonstrates Beesley was not alone. 
7. Recommendations  
Threatening unscrupulous developers with criminal sanctions, would appear the best 
deterrent, especially with the added threat of recovering the proceeds of the crime under 
the POCA. However, at present there is no sign that breaches of planning control will be 
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criminalised under the T&CPA. ; tThe only option therefore, would be to bring charges 
under the FA, but with the absence of a statutory ‘declaration of truth’, the costs and time 
involved are likely to discourage the LPA’s from adopting such practice. Accordingly, unless 
the government increase LPA’s funding, enforcement action will remain subordinate until 
the authority is compelled to take enforcement action due to the shocking nature of the 
case, as with Beesley or Fidler.324 Undoubtedly, the planning system is more complicated 
now than ever before, but it is certainly much easier to critique the law than to suggest 
definitive proposals for reform.325                                        
Over time cases will diminish, as developers will realise they will no longer benefit 
from deliberate concealment.  Considering the Beesley principle survived the introduction of 
the PEO procedure, the effectiveness of the statute is less concerning, as it is clear Beesley is 
suitable to cover the problem. Nevertheless, additional enforcement powers, such as 
criminalising planning breaches, ought to be reconsidered.  
 In the meantime it is suggested that procedures to criminalise planning breaches should be 
implemented, in a serious attempt to deter developers that intentionally plan to deceive LPAs. 
Whether the deception is concealing the nature or full extent of the development or deliberately 
failing to apply for planning permission.  
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